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Abstract 
There is currently a lack of empirical insights which explore the activities related to state and 
local law enforcement’s analytic function.  This research is intended to remedy this shortcoming. 
Drawing on a national sample of 345 state and local law enforcement agencies, this research 
provides an empirical description of the types of analytic activities, sources of information, and 
analyst performance evaluation within police agencies in the United States.  Results indicate that 
agencies are primarily engaged in crime analysis activities, access more information via 
databases than is received from outside agencies, and that few responding agencies have 
identified factors critical to the evaluation of intelligence analysts.  Context for these findings 
and implications for practice are discussed.  
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Intelligence Analysis within U.S. Law Enforcement Agencies: 
Empirical Insights from a National Sample 
Purpose of the Research 
There is currently a lack of empirical insight with regard to the function of intelligence 
analysis within state and local law enforcement organizations.  The majority of research to date 
is either conceptual or qualitative and is usually a small focus of a broader reach focus – such as 
intelligence-led policing, counter-terrorism, or homeland security.  This is not to infer that these 
conceptual or qualitative research contributions are of limited value as they are necessary to 
begin the process of building a knowledgebase related to intelligence analysis.  Without efforts 
to develop a conceptual understanding of how intelligence analysis fits within law enforcement 
organizations (post-September 11th, 2001 especially) as well as qualitative insights of analytic 
practices, carrying out an empirical exploration would be, at the very least, difficult and likely 
misguided.  Further guiding research efforts – as well as practitioners – on the evolving function 
of intelligence analysis are the reports and recommendations from government entities and 
professional associations.  The research presented here is not intended to make the leap from 
concept to causation with empirical analysis.  The present research is intended to provide a 
empirically-informed description of the type of analytic methods, sources of information, and 
performance evaluation activities engaged in by state and local law enforcement agencies in the 
United States.  The present research utilizes data from a national sample of state and local law 
enforcement agencies.  Policy implications and recommendations for enhanced practices are 
provided.  
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Literature Review 
Intelligence Analysis and a Limited Knowledgebase 
Research related to intelligence analysis in the context of state and local law enforcement 
has largely been relegated to a sub-area of a broader research focus – such as homeland security 
(Giblin, Schafer & Burress, 2009; Oliver, 2006, 2009; Pelfrey, 2009), intelligence-led policing 
(Carter & Carter, 2009a; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013; Ratcliffe, 2008; Schaible & Sheffield, 
2013), fusion centers (Carter & Carter, 2009b; Carter & Chermak, 2012; Cooney, Roejk & 
Kaminski, 2011; Graphi-Joyal, 2010), and counter-terrorism (Innes, 2006; McGarrell, Freilich & 
Chermak, 2007, White, 2004).  Of the sparse research available on intelligence analysis, the bulk 
of this information comes from assessments of analysis at the federal level as part of examining 
counter-terrorism strategies.  Unfortunately, just as McGarrell et al., (2007) point out, there is 
little empirical research that assesses the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies involving 
local law enforcement organizations.  Though his research was conducted prior to 9/11, Silke’s 
(2001) review of counter-terrorism literature indicated that only three percent of articles in 
refereed terrorism journals used inferential analysis, compared to 86% in forensic psychology 
and 60% in criminology. Moreover, Lum, Kennedy and Shrley’s (2006) Campbell systematic 
review of terrorism articles published between 1971 and 2003 similarly found the same 
percentage (3%) were empirical.  Specific empirical research to law enforcement intelligence 
and counter-terrorism are even scarcer and were typically conducted prior to 9/11 (see Riley & 
Hoffman, 1995; Riley, Treverton, Wilson, & Davis, 2005) and are thus not considered in the 
current review of literature.   
Though intelligence analysis is appropriate for consideration, and critical to, under these 
broader areas of research, the knowledgebase lacks a specific exploration of the types of analytic 
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activities and sources of information utilized among state and local law enforcement in the 
United States.  This lack of research is not indicative of a lack of importance or commitment to 
the analytic function within state and local policing, rather a lack of specific focus on the 
organizational capability on its own.  Furthermore, an analytic function should not be viewed as 
a capability of only larger agencies, but a necessary function of all public safety organizations.  
The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2003) 
stated that all agencies regardless of size must have a minimum intelligence capability – and thus 
an analytic component.  Despite an emphasis on ubiquitous intelligence activity across state and 
local agencies, the limited research to date is mixed with regards to the impact of agency size and 
intelligence practices.  Giblin et al. (2009) found that receiving information to integrate into the 
intelligence process was much more likely among large agencies (94.4%) versus small agencies 
(37.5%) while Carter (In Press) found size to have no influence on intelligence practices.   
 
Analytic Activities  
 Put simply, crime analysis and intelligence analysis are different disciplines.  Crime 
analysis “assesses the interactive effects and covariance of explicit variables of crimes that have 
occurred in order to determine a perpetrator’s methodologies with the intent to clear the crimes 
and prevent future incidents by apprehending the perpetrator” (Carter, 2009, p. 83).  Such a 
technique is most effective when focusing on habitual offenders (Croisdale, 2007; Lemieux, 
2008).  Conversely, intelligence analysis “deals with threats, whether from terrorism, criminal 
extremism, or organized crime, through the analysis of information that suggests a threat, the 
identification of intelligence requirements, and the use of both target and vulnerability 
assessments, with the intent of preventing the threat from reaching fruition” (Carter, 2009, p. 83).  
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Though there are distinct differences between crime and intelligence analysis, the application of 
an analytic process to best fit the needs of individual agencies on a daily basis for most effective 
outcomes relies upon an integration of analytic methods across each of these disciplines.  In 
reality, state and local law enforcement agencies are tasked with combatting crime the vast 
majority of the time and by utilizing methods and sources of information from both analytic 
disciplines, agencies can best position their resources to have the most direct impact on crime.   
Ratcliffe (2011, p. 4) refers to this concept as “crime intelligence.”  A relatively 
contemporary term, crime intelligence represents a mixture of crime analysis and criminal 
intelligence, arguing for collaboration between two strands of analysis that – in the US at least – 
are often kept separate.  Crime analysis can tell a decision‐maker what is going on, and criminal 
intelligence, rooted as it is in understanding and explaining patterns of criminal behavior, can tell 
a decision‐maker why.  Similarly, the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Analysts (IALEIA, 2012, p. 28) states criminal Intelligence is referred to as information 
compiled, analyzed, and disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal 
activity.  The primary benefit of integrating the two analytic disciplines is to ensure law 
enforcement is utilizing the most wide-ranging and comprehensive methods of identifying 
criminal activity and possible threats (whether a threat is considered to be crime or a terrorist 
event).  These analytic processes rely upon a range of analytic activities that can be combined 
together to maximize daily tasks.  
Further emphasizing the importance of the integration of these various analytic methods 
was the U.S. Department of Justice (2010) which published the Common Competencies for State, 
Local, and Tribal Intelligence Analysts to guide analytic capabilities at the state, local, and 
fusion center levels.  Within this recommendation document it identifies a range of analytic 
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techniques, methods, and tools as competencies for analysts that go beyond traditional crime 
analysis – such as geospatial and social networking analysis. This guide refers to these 
techniques as a fusion between intelligence and law enforcement tradecraft in the homeland 
security environment.  Although techniques such as GeoSpatial and mapping are often viewed as 
crime-centric, when combined with additional techniques (such as social network analysis or 
analyzing suspicious activity reports) these methods can yield insightful and actionable products 
that can impact both crime and terrorism.   
 
Sources of Information  
Though only anecdotal evidence has been available to this point, data quality has been 
found to affect the development of informative and actionable analyses (Cope, 2004).  Analytic 
products that rely on information input to create a desired output are contingent on the quality of 
the data input.  The analytic process is understood rather simply in the negative context; bad 
information in, bad information out.  The quality of analytic methods could be superior, but 
when dealing with poor or limited information from the beginning, the output is going to suffer.  
Unfortunately, this process is not as simple when an analyst has good information, or a wide 
range of information readily available.  While bad information input will always equate to bad 
information output, good information input will not always equate to good information output – 
as quality analytic products rely too heavily on the quality of the analytic process.  The quality of 
the common analytic foundation within state and local law enforcement has been a continual 
focus for professionals within the field.  Recently, IALEIA has drafted a revision of the Law 
Enforcement Analytic Standards to further professionalize and standardize the quality of 
intelligence analysis.  Uniform quality is of critical importance as information collected from all 
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sources must be – at a minimum – “evaluated and designated for source reliability, content 
validity, and relevancy. The veracity of information is crucial, not only to the validity of the 
intelligence product, but also to officer safety, investigative effectiveness, and solidity of 
evidence in prosecutions” (IALEIA, 2012, p. 15). 
 However, the congruence of analytic quality is challenged as the number of information 
sources continues to grow exponentially in the digital era.  Moreover, many emerging 
information sources are new to most law enforcement personnel and are not discussed during 
many traditional training programs. For example, the emergence of social networking websites 
has created a potential wealth of useful information for law enforcement while at the same time 
presenting its own unique challenges.  As the Global Intelligence Working Group (2013) 
recently discussed in their publication of the Developing a Policy on the Use of Social Media 
in Intelligence and Investigative Activities: 
“Social media sites can be valuable sources of information for law enforcement personnel 
as they fulfill their public safety mission – agency public information officers may use 
social media to interact with the public, detectives may access social media sites to assist 
in the identification and apprehension of criminal subjects, intelligence analysts may 
utilize social media resources as they develop intelligence products regarding emerging 
criminal activity, and fusion center analysts may use social media resources to assist in 
the development of analytic assessments.  To successfully and lawfully harness the power 
and value of social media sites, while ensuring that individuals’ and groups’ privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties are protected, agency leadership should support the development 
of a policy within their agency regarding the use of social media sites in criminal 
intelligence and investigative activity (p. 6).” 
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Social networks are considered “open sources” of information.  These sources of information – 
most commonly anything in public view on the Internet or news stories – do not require a 
warrant and/or are accessible without requiring user access.  Open sources of information are 
becoming increasingly more prevalent and useful for law enforcement in gaining information to 
build investigations as well as de-conflict and confirm existing information.   
While drawing upon emerging sources of information is challenging for U.S. law 
enforcement, it is not unprecedented and history suggests successes are likely to occur if 
intelligence analysis follows previous policing trends.  The implementation of intelligence-led 
policing into many American law enforcement organizations has begun to lay the foundation for 
enhanced information sharing and analysis (Carter, In Press; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013).  This 
emerging policing paradigm has roots in previous philosophies – such as community and 
problem-oriented policing (Carter & Carter, 2009a; Schaible & Sheffield, 2013).  Recently, 
Ratcliffe (2011, p. 5) noted problem‐oriented policing (POP) has a “natural synergy” with 
intelligence‐led policing as both seek amore long‐term, strategic, risk focused and 
comprehensive solution to crime.  Given its focus on more in-depth societal-level issues, 
problem‐oriented policing requires law enforcement to delve deeper into the underlying 
problems that affect public safety and to do so requires police to be able to scan across a range of 
data and information sources to identify problems, analyze these problems and identify the 
underlying issue, prior to addressing the problem (Clarke 2004; Eck 2006; Goldstein 2003).   
 Though insights into intelligence analysts within state and local law enforcement are rare, 
same insights can be garnered from examinations of analysts at the federal level (caution must be 
taken here as the mission, operational focus, and even laws guiding analysis at the federal level 
differ greatly from those at the state and local level).  In their qualitative study of intelligence 
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analysts working within the Intelligence Community, Gotz, Zhou and Wen (2006) found that all 
of the analysts they observed and interviewed expressed the need for more robust information 
sources.  More specifically, analysts desired low-level event or factual information.  During their 
study, analysts spent more time looking for low-level information as they gathered evidence to 
support or refute the already-developed process model or the crime/event that occurred or the 
illustration of a potential threat on the horizon.  Moreover, their observations indicated that 
analysts tightly coupled their access to a variety of data sources.  As analysts discovered 
potential evidence, they would immediately access other information sources to confirm or refute 
their understanding of what they had found.  Though most analysts have been found to utilize 
different information sources to confirm or de-conflict information related to a crime incident 
(Chin Jr, Kuchar & Wolf, 2009) – which is typically considered crime analysis to aid an 
investigation – a variety of information sources is intended to enhance an intelligence analyst’s 
ability to depict a “threat picture” for decision makers; a difficult task to say the least.  It should 
be noted that advanced education and training requirements are likely to enhance analysts’ 
ability to think analytically and process various sources of information (Cope, 2004) – thus 
easing the learning curve and facilitating effectiveness.   
 
Training and Analyst Performance Evaluation 
The profession of intelligence analysis has been on a progressive trajectory towards 
unified standards, minimum analyst capabilities, and appropriate evaluation to ensure quality 
products.  As Marrin (2008) eloquently surmises: 
“Intelligence analysis is viewed as both a craft and a profession.  A craft “because it 
requires mastery of a skill set that can be acquired only through practical experience and 
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a profession because much of the substantive knowledge that practitioners require can be 
transferred to new practitioners through a structured personnel process that includes an 
educational component” (p.139).   
The substantive knowledge Marrin refers to is achieved through training programs delivered by 
the appropriate personnel (e.g. senior analysts and subject matter experts).  Training impacts 
processes within an organizational – such as the ability to perform tasks efficiently and 
effectively.  Related to this issue, training can also influence the organization’s expectations of 
how an individual performs their job and as a result, how their job performance is evaluated.  
Relevant to the present research, agencies which require analysts to receive training on 
intelligence are likely to differ from those agencies which do not have training requirements.     
In their recent study of intelligence training among 345 state and local law enforcement 
organizations, Carter, Carter, and Chermak (2013) found the most frequently attended training 
programs were the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) (43%), Foundations of 
Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) (28%), and Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) 28 CFR 
Part 23 (28%) programs.  The least commonly attended training programs among the sample 
studied were the Center for Intelligence Training (CIT) (6%), Regional Counter-Drug Training 
Academy (RCTA) (11%) and the Federal Law Enforcement Analyst Training (FLEAT) (10%) 
programs.  This study also found that among the sampled law enforcement agencies there was an 
overall lack of participation in federally-funded intelligence training programs – the overall 
average attendance of these training programs was just 20 percent (Carter et al., 2013).  
Moreover, the sampled agencies indicated an overall lack of training requirements with regard to 
critical components of the contemporary intelligence environment.  Only 20 percent of state and 
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local agencies required training specifically on intelligence-led policing followed by limited 
improvements with respect to privacy policies (37%) and precursors to terrorism (40%).   
Clearly tied to the effects of training is how well employees perform their tasks after the 
training.  There is limited research on law enforcement intelligence and performance.  That 
which does exist has been limited to intelligence analysts.  Performance measurement has been 
cited as a central tenet to determine the effectiveness of law enforcement intelligence (Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1997).  Being able to accurately evaluate and measure 
performance within an organization plays a critical role in the organization’s ability to assess 
efficiency, effectiveness and progress of outcomes and outputs.  At the organizational-level, 
measurement allows administrators to make accurate decisions for resource allocation, daily 
operations, and the performance of individuals and the organization as a whole (de Lancer Julnes 
& Holzer, 2001; Radin, 2000).  Fundamental to any organization is that what gets measured gets 
done (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).  At the tactical- and operational-levels, analytic products guide 
law enforcement’s response to short- and long-term crimes and threats (Carter & Carter, 2009a; 
Ratcliffe, 2008).   
Utilizing intelligence for law enforcement purposes is commonly referred to as the 
“business model” of policing (Ratcliffe, 2008) and as such relies on a quality analytic component 
to achieve optimal results.  Intelligence analysts are the source of this analytic component so it is 
logical to assume that the quality of analysts’ products will have an impact on the intelligence 
process.  To put it simply, intelligence analysts should be evaluated based upon the quality of 
their products, not quantity.  Quality intelligence products are reports and/or recommendations 
provided by analysts that influence the decision-making of persons within the organizations for 
purposes of resource allocation, investigations, and operations.  The ability of analysts to achieve 
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this level of performance relies significantly on the evolving professionalism of the analyst 
position as well as the culture of police organizations (IALEIA, 2012).  A lack of available 
training for analysts and coupled with a reluctance to recognize analysts as professionals within 
the law enforcement arena has inhibited the progress of analysts’ ability to provide influential 
products (Osborne, 2006).   
Training is provides a critical opportunity to communicate understanding of new policy 
and procedural changes.  Chief executives often have a more comprehensive understanding of 
intelligence capacities as compared to line level officers (Cope, 2004; Carter, 2009).  This lack of 
understanding among line level officers can be attributed to resistance to “new” policing 
methods (Ratcliffe, 2008) or poor perceptions of outputs on behalf of sworn officers and civilian 
analysts (Cope, 2004).  Morabito (2010) found a positive relationship between training and 
community policing adoption while Schafer et al. (2009) found a positive relationship between 
training and local law enforcement agencies in Illinois that are adopting homeland security 
preparedness.  Despite a recognized demand for training on intelligence issues (Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 2009), there is little supply.  While training focused on community policing is widely 
accepted, 99% of state and local police academies have courses designed for community policing 
operations, only 11% have courses designed to encompass issues most commonly associated 
with intelligence, such as terrorism and homeland security (Rojek, Kaminski, Smith & Scheer, 
2007).   
 
Organizational Commitment   
Just as training has been found to facilitate the integration of new organizational 
functions (Yates & Pillai, 1996), institutionalization of the new concept – in the form of 
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organizational commitment – has also been found to facilitate adoption (Morabito, 2010). 
Organizational commitment can manifest itself in a variety of forms.  Perhaps the most common 
measure of commitment is support from the executive of the organization (Bulut & Culha, 2010).  
A rather straightforward concept, if a new organizational function has the formal endorsement 
from the highest level of management, it is more likely to succeed and be effective.  As this 
measurement of commitment can, at times, be vague and perhaps viewed as politically motivated 
or “window dressing” (Buchanan, 1981), another common assessment of organizational 
commitment is the extent to which an organization integrates a new function into its formal 
evaluation of personnel (Eaton, 2003).  This approach is summarized by the old adage of “what 
gets measured gets done.”  If an organization integrates a new function into employee 
evaluations, it increases the likelihood this function will be tangible at the operational level as 
well as an expected performance by upper management – thus committing to the new function.  
Recent examples of such successes have been demonstrated in the process of 
implementing community policing and intelligence-led policing.  Ford, Weissbein and 
Plamondon (2003) found commitment to be positively associated with community-policing 
operations, a tenet outlined as a philosophical “must have” for successful community policing 
implementation (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994).  Moore and Stephens (1991) refer to chiefs 
of policing agencies as “executives” in that they are aware of strategic management that will 
allow for the successful integration of necessary philosophies to meet the needs of their 
environment.  The necessity of commitment from the chief executive for a successful 
intelligence function to be implemented has been acknowledged in research (Carter & Carter, 
2009a; Carter & Phillips, 2014; Ratcliffe, 2008) and professional publications (Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 2009; Global Intelligence Working Group, 2003). 
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Methodology 
Data were gleaned from a larger project funded by the National Institute of Justice3 
which conducted a national survey of law enforcement intelligence practices of different key 
personnel.  The survey sample consisted of state and local law enforcement officers tasked with 
building an intelligence capacity for individual agencies.  Given the evolving nature of the 
intelligence concept, it is critical to target key personnel working within the intelligence 
capability of a police department to increase the likelihood of valid responses.  This approach has 
been utilized in police research focused on specialty personnel when examining issues such as 
informal policing the mentally ill (Borum et al., 1998) and policing sex workers (Simic et al., 
2006).   
 
Survey of Key Personnel 
In order to obtain insights into intelligence practice of local law enforcement agencies, a 
web-designed survey was distributed to law enforcement personnel across the United States.  
More specifically, these persons were individuals who had attended a national law enforcement 
intelligence training program funded by the Department of Homeland Security.  Individuals 
selected to attend this training program were typically selected by their agency to lead the efforts 
to develop or re-engineer their agency’s intelligence capacity.  Most had little previous 
experience in law enforcement intelligence and were seeking guidance, through the training, on 
how to develop their agency’s intelligence capacity.  This sampling strategy, which includes 
personnel from significantly different sized police agencies in all geographic regions of the 
                                                 
3 This research was sponsored by grant award number 2008-IJ-CX-0007 from the National Institute of Justice, US 
Department of Justice.  Points of view or opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the official position of the National Institute of Justice or the US Department of Justice.  
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country, was chosen for three reasons.  First, in attending this training, these officers were 
identified by their respective agency as a representative of the intelligence function within the 
agency.  Second, as a result of their selection on behalf of their agency, this sample includes law 
enforcement personnel who have a working understanding of key issues related to intelligence, 
and thus will be able to address specifically the factors associated with the implementation 
process.  Third, their awareness of the contemporary intelligence structures, requirements, and 
formal communication networks increases the likelihood that they will have direct knowledge 
about the extent to which their agency has adopted this new philosophy.   
Data collection occurred from June 2009 – April 2010.  After bad e-mail addresses were 
removed from the sampling frame, 2,025 email invitations were sent to the law enforcement 
sample and 414 replies were received (20.4% response rate).  A portion of these responses were 
not included in the current analysis that follows because a respondent either left all survey cells 
blank or responded with not applicable.  Moreover, certain organizations – such as fusion 
centers, regional information sharing system centers, and federal agencies – were removed from 
the current analysis as their roles in intelligence analysis clearly differ from those of state and 
local law enforcement.  In order to learn why the response rates were not higher, the research 
team conducted follow-up telephone interviews with 100 randomly selected participants from the 
law enforcement sample.  Among the key reasons that were consistently reported for not 
responding, job responsibility, survey length, and security appeared to be major obstacles for 
survey completion.  
A number of individuals stated that they had been reassigned or promoted and no longer 
worked in the intelligence function.  As a result they either felt the survey no longer applied to 
them or they were not familiar with current activities in the intelligence function.  With respect 
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to survey length, in order to fully explore the nature of and challenges to law enforcement 
intelligence work, the survey asked respondents more than 100 questions.  Feedback suggests 
individuals were uncomfortable committing to this task, especially when they were at work. 
Lastly, a number of individuals expressed concern regarding the security implications of sharing 
information about intelligence activities outside of the law enforcement community.  Despite the 
low response rate, the present study provides unique value because there has been so little 
empirical research specifically on intelligence analysts, especially at the national-level.  The 
construction of exact survey items included in this research are provided in Appendix A. 
Table 1 displays descriptive information for the state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
agencies represented in the current study.  The median agency size is 276 total sworn and non-
sworn personnel while the majority of agencies were located in the Midwest region of the United 
States, followed closely by the Southeast and Northwest.  Respondents are mostly investigators 
and administrators who have been employed by their agency for more than 15 years.  To provide 
context for the type of intelligence capacities within the sample agencies, general descriptives of 
key intelligence capacity indicators are also included.  As can be seen in Table 1, the majority of 
the agencies indicated their intelligence capacities are aligned with the recommendations of the 
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and have a specific policy guiding their intelligence 
function.  Most agencies indicated having aligned their capacity with the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Targeted Capabilities List.  Though a little less than half of the agencies 
indicate they have adopted intelligence-led policing, this is not surprising as many agencies and 
intelligence personnel are unsure as to what constitutes an intelligence-led policing function.   
[ Table 1 approximately here ] 
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Relationship Variable: Intelligence Training Requirement 
 As discussed earlier, previous research suggests training on specific aspects of police 
operations is likely to facilitate adoption of the desired operational component as well as 
improved and sustained effectiveness of the operations.  Moreover, training specific to a more 
complex policing philosophy has been found to enhance the effectiveness of the desired 
operational outcome (Chappell, 2008).  As such, it is believed that agencies which require their 
intelligence analysts to be trained specifically on intelligence-led policing (the driving concept 
behind the utilization of intelligence and information sharing), will differ from agencies that lack 
such a requirement.  In short, agencies that require intelligence training are more likely to exhibit 
characteristics of active information sharing and analytic processes – likely resulting from 
exposure to analytic concepts and methods as well as gaining connectivity to information sharing 
resources such as secure portals and subscriptions to databases (not to mention informal 
networking with other analysts).  The current study explores relationship differences across 
independent groups of agencies that require intelligence training and those that do not.  To 
control for this difference, respondents were asked to indicate if their agency required analyst to 
receive training specifically on intelligence-led policing.  Agencies responding in the affirmative 
are the reference group.  The sample included 70 agencies (20.3%) responding they required 
analyst to receive intelligence training.   
 
Relationship Variable: Organizational Commitment to Intelligence 
 Similar to training and as discussed previously, research also indicates commitment from 
the organization is likely to facilitate effectiveness of police operations.  Additionally, as the 
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nature of the police operation becomes more complex and innovative, commitment has been 
found to be more salient for success – such as with community policing implementation (Ford et 
al., 2003, Morabito, 2010).  Commitment can be a somewhat vague concept that is difficult to 
capture with a single item.  As such, the present study utilizes two items which demonstrates an 
agency’s commitment to intelligence.  First, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they agreed the agency felt intelligence was a priority within their agency.  Second, 
respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed the agency rewarded 
intelligence through the process of formal evaluations.  Responses were re-coded into 
dichotomous “Yes/No” with respondents indicating “Strongly Agree” or “Agree” coded as the 
affirmative.  The two items were then added together to create a commitment index with a range 
of zero to two.  The extent to which agencies were committed to intelligence varied greatly as the 
mean commitment score was 1.04 with a standard deviation of .85.   
 
Findings 
Analytic Activities  
 Table 2 displays the frequencies for types of analytic activities in which agencies indicate 
analysts are engaged.  Not surprisingly, respondents indicated the most frequent analytic activity 
in which their agency engaged was criminal investigation support (49.3% daily/weekly).  This 
same activity was also the least frequent with regards to never occurring - though it is difficult to 
imagine an agency within the sample would never provide criminal investigation support.  The 
second most frequently occurring analytic activity as indicated by respondents was alerts and 
notifications (41.2% daily/weekly), followed by case correlation (35.6 daily/weekly), crime 
pattern analysis (31.6% daily/weekly), and analyze suspicious activity reports (30.4% 
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daily/weekly).  The analytic activities respondents’ indicated their agencies engaged in the least 
were public health trend analysis (5.8% daily/weekly, 72.2% never), criminal commodity 
vulnerability (6.3% daily/weekly, 73.0% never), statewide or regional risk assessments (7.5% 
daily/weekly, 66.1% never), and traffic analysis (11.9% daily/weekly, 62.0% never).  
 
[ Table 2 approximately here ] 
 
 Analytic activities extent beyond the tasks agency members engage in to the actual 
products and outputs these different analytic tasks yield when combined.  Table 3 illustrates the 
frequency in which respondents indicated their agency produced varying analytic products.  
Respondents indicated risk assessments (51.9% daily/weekly) as the most frequently created 
analytic products followed by alerts (42.0% daily/weekly), and warnings (40.9% daily/weekly).  
Least common products, as indicated by respondents, were bulletins (29.2% daily/weekly, 21.7% 
never), briefings (34.2% daily/weekly, 35.7% never), and executive reports (38.6% daily/weekly, 
43.5% never).  It is worth noting that it appears briefings and bulletins could be driven by 
requests for these products as they are the only products above 10% in this category.   
 
[ Table 3 approximately here ] 
 
Sources of Information  
 The analytic process, and thus analytic activities and products, is fueled by information.  
Agencies and analysts utilize information from a variety of sources.  This information reaches 
the analytic process within law enforcement organizations through a push or pull information 
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flow (Ratcliffe, 2008).  Pushed information is information that is received by an agency without 
solicitation and is the result of proactive information sharing – a desired aspect of post-9/11 
information sharing.  Pulled information is information that is actively sought out by the agency 
or analyst and is received via a request for information or a search within a database system.  The 
majority of information pushed to law enforcement agencies comes from the public via tips and 
leads, suspicious activity reports, or through community concerns (Bullock, 2013).  
Unfortunately, given the difficulty of measurement and variance associated with informal 
information sharing between the police and community, the present study cannot account for this 
activity.  The present study provides a description of the information pushed to the current 
sample of respondents from other agencies outside of their own – perhaps the second most 
common type of information push within policing. The present study also captures descriptives 
regarding the most common method of information pull – the information which agencies have 
access to query.  
 Table 4 displays the frequency at which agencies indicated receiving various types of 
information from outside agencies.  The type of information most frequently received by 
responding agencies was news reports (57.9% daily/weekly) followed by other open sources 
(53.9% daily/weekly).  Most common sources of information received from other agencies that 
were not open source were suspicious activity reports (48.7% daily/weekly) and crime reports 
(50.4% daily/weekly).  Respondents indicated the least frequent types of information received 
from outside agencies were interrogations from witnesses and suspects (22.3% daily/weekly, 
51.3% never) and crime maps (24.2% daily/weekly, 44.1% never).  Worth noting is the inability 
to draw conclusions regarding outside agency analytic capabilities based on the information they 
share with responding agencies.  For example, respondents indicated receiving threat 
21 
 
assessments 28.7 percent of the time on a combined daily/weekly basis.  Conclusions cannot be 
drawn that agencies sharing this information do not produce threat assessments within their own 
agency on a more frequent basis – they may simply share their threat assessment products with 
outside agencies on a less frequent basis.  
 
[ Table 4 approximately here ] 
 
 Information pulled into the agency is most common through accessing databases and 
sharing systems.  Table 5 provides descriptive information on the types of information to which 
agencies have access.  Respondents indicated the most common types of information sources 
their agencies had access to were motor vehicle records (83.8%), driver’s license information 
(83.8%), sex offender registries (80.9%), and the National Crime Information Center (78.0%).  
The least common sources of information agencies had access to were the Open Source 
Information System (9.3%) and the Regional and National Data Exchange (9.9%).  The general 
trend presented in Table 5 is that agencies continue to maintain access to more traditional 
sources of information rather than contemporary or emerging sources – such as the Homeland 
Security Information Network or the Regional and National Data Exchange.   
 
Performance Evaluation 
 The potential for intelligence analysts to impact an organization and its decision making 
can be directly tied to the quality of their performance evaluations.  Though it seems rather 
intuitive to assume quality is better than quantity, this common knowledge does not always 
translate up and down the chain of command within law enforcement.  Moreover, given a lack of 
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training, consistently agreed upon performance standards for analysts, and even a general 
understanding of the role of intelligence in many law enforcement organizations, it is 
increasingly difficult for agencies to properly evaluate their intelligence analysts.  Table 6 
presents information on the types of factors believed to be most critical for analyst performance 
evaluation as indicated by respondents.  The raw numbers are promising, but also disappointing.  
Most disappointing of all is that just over a quarter of the agencies in the sample (28.1%) 
indicated they do not evaluate the performance of their analysts.  Furthermore, the percentages 
across the different types of possible performance evaluation factors are all relatively low with 
the highest percentage of responding agencies indicating they relied upon the quality of strategic 
products as a critical factor for evaluation.  The promising information is that it appears of the 
agencies that responded in the affirmative across the different factors, that the factors associated 
with quality were the most common.  Quality analytic products rely upon a process of quality 
control – not the production and counting of widgets.  Analysts that “copy and paste” 
information onto an agency template are not engaging in analysis, and thus are not effective to 
information decision makers.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
  The present study focused on providing an empirical description of the types of analytic 
activities and sources of information utilized within a sample of 345 state and local law 
enforcement agencies in the United States.  Generally, results indicate that law enforcement 
agencies predominantly engage in activities traditionally associated with crime analysis.  Such a 
finding is not surprising as the vast majority of state and local law enforcement agencies are 
primarily tasked with combating street crime (i.e. robbery, burglary, rape, etc.) and not terrorism 
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or complex criminality (i.e. organized crime).  As such, their analytic activities are likely to 
support this primary crime mission.  Moreover, such a finding is reinforced with the sources of 
information presented in Table 5.  The most common sources of information across the sample 
were the same sources of information that law enforcement primarily utilized prior to 9/11 to 
facilitate criminal investigations and crime analysis – such as sex offender registries and the 
National Crime Information Center.   
Caution must be taken when assessing this information as the present research cannot 
control for relationships between agencies and their efforts to share information and be more 
information-savvy post-9/11.  The findings presented here are from a cross-sectional research 
survey – thus a snapshot in time that merely paints a picture to help understand more about a 
phenomenon.  Also worth mentioning is that despite a conceptual and operational difference 
between crime analysis and intelligence analysis and noted previously, the two do not operate 
independent of one another.  Intelligence analysis routinely involves activities that are typically 
considered crime analysis – such as crime mapping.  Since intelligence analysis is much broader 
and undefined as crime analysis, given the focus on an undefined threat, the types of analytic 
activities can be wide-ranging.  Conversely, crime analysis is unlikely to integrate activities 
typically associated with intelligence-analysis as crime analysis is focused on defined events that 
happened in the past. 
With respect to information flow within agencies, it appears information is pulled more 
than it is pushed.  Such a finding is to be expected as many agencies conduct analysis for intra-
agency use – such as “be on the lookouts” (BOLOs) and jurisdiction-specific crime trends.  
These products rely more on pulling information from local data systems and criminal records 
then on information proactively shared by other organizations.  Agencies appear to receive open 
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source information most frequently from other agencies.  This is not overly surprising as this 
type of information requires minimal, if any, analysis and is typically pushed to the sending 
agency in the first place from a separate originating source.  For example, the Police Executive 
Research Forum pushes out their “Daily Clips” to all members on their list serve4 – which has 
many state and local police members.  These Daily Clips are a collection of the most recent and 
law enforcement-relevant news stories.  If an agency receives a Daily Clip that contains a news 
story related to a crime or issue with local relevance, the agency is likely to push this information 
along to other local agencies.  
Generally, least common sources of information that analysts had access to were rather 
contemporary, intelligence-based sharing systems.  With the exception of Law Enforcement 
Online (64.9% had access) and the Regional Information Sharing System (55.9% had access), 
the sources of information that can be considered “post-9/11 intelligence” systems were rather 
uncommon among the sample.  Worth noting, and considering as a plausible explanation for less 
access being indicated by respondents, is that many agencies – especially at the local level – will 
only need to have access to one of these sharing systems, not multiple.  It is the author’s 
experience that Law Enforcement Online and the Regional Information Sharing System 
represent the most common sharing systems among state and local law enforcement.  In short, it 
is unexpected and unnecessary for the average law enforcement agency in the U.S. to have 
access to multiple sharing systems that are primarily counter-terrorism or homeland security 
focused.  Inter-related to this issue of access to these sharing systems is a lack of certified 
intelligence and analytic training programs available to state and local law enforcement.  It is 
through these training programs that state and local agencies gain knowledge of, and access to, 
these systems.   
                                                 
4 For more information visit http://www.policeforum.org/perf-membership/ 
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Carter et al. (2013) discuss this lack of available training and the driving forces behind 
intelligence training among law enforcement and when determining why SLATT, FIAT and the 
BJA 28 CFR Part 23 training programs were the most commonly attended training programs, the 
authors noted the primary reason appeared to be availability.  All of these training programs are 
offered throughout the U.S. - therefore making them easier and cheaper to attend.  The FBI, 
RCTA and most FLEAT programs require potential attendees to travel to a centralized location 
for the training which can significantly increase the cost and inconvenience to the agency.  The 
findings appeared to indicate that the actual course content is less relevant as compared to these 
resource factors.  It also appeared there is a desire for intelligence training of any type, as long as 
it inexpensive and easily accessible (Carter et al., 2013).  Such limited training availability, 
especially given current downward financial trends within public safety-related efforts, has direct 
implications for the progression of quality and unified standards for intelligence analysis.   
This lack of training is likely to be inter-related to the disappointing proportions 
associated with analyst performance evaluation.  Law enforcement personnel learn what metrics 
are appropriate and effective for evaluation through training programs.  Without adequate access 
to these programs (and the resources to attend them), agencies go without the necessary 
knowledge to implement evaluation strategies.  Most discouraging is that 28.1 percent of 
agencies sampled indicate they do conduct analyst performance evaluations.  Without formal 
evaluation processes in place, it is difficult for agencies to develop standards for analytic quality 
and analyst promotion as well as the importance of integrating intelligence into the organization.  
Moreover, the percentages of agencies identifying factors critical for analyst evaluation were 
generally low.  The highest percentage of respondents identified quality of strategic products as a 
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critical factor for evaluation.  Though this is promising, as quality should be the guiding 
principal for evaluation, the percentage is nonetheless lower than ideal.   
To truly assess the effectiveness of any organizational function, especially innovative 
capabilities, an empirical outcome evaluation is needed.  However, prior to conducting such an 
evaluation, a valid and reliable knowledgebase must exist by which comparisons can be made 
and conclusions drawn against; law enforcement intelligence and the integration of intelligence 
analysis within agencies are simply not at this juncture.  To progress the understanding of what 
academics and practitioners know about the use of analysis – both intelligence and criminal – is 
to conceptualize and explore these functions within law enforcement organizations.  The 
research presented here is a step in this direction.  The difficulty of identifying persons with 
intimate knowledge of intelligence and analytic practices is a legitimate challenge in its own 
right.  This, when coupled with the challenge of deriving a representative sample of agencies 
from the state and local level, makes conducting empirical research on intelligence-related 
phenomena all the more difficult.  So while the present study may have limitations – such as a 
less-than-ideal response rate, lack of comparison agencies (those with no analytic capability), 
and an inability to draw statistical conclusions on the strength of relationship between 
organizational characteristics and analytic capability, it is nonetheless an empirical exploration of 
an arguably representative sample of state and local law enforcement agencies and their analytic 
function.    
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Law Enforcement Sample Descriptives (n = 345) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Median (Mean) 
Agency Size 276 (1341) 
 
 Valid Percent (n) 
Agency Region 
          Northeast 
          Southeast 
          Midwest 
          Southwest 
          West 
 
22% (77) 
23% (80) 
27% (91) 
11% (37) 
17% (60) 
Respondent’s Position 
          Administrator 
          Supervisor 
          Investigator 
          Analyst 
 
29% (100) 
23% (81) 
32% (110) 
16% (54) 
Respondent Years at Agency 
          Less than 1 Year 
          1-3 Years 
          4-9 Years 
          10-15 Years 
          More than 15 Years 
 
.3% (1) 
6% (20) 
18% (64) 
21% (73) 
55% (187)  
Agency Intelligence Capacity  
          Agency has adopted intelligence-led policing 
          Agency has specific intelligence policy 
          Intelligence capacity aligns with the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
          Intelligence capacity aligns with the DHS Targeted Capabilities List 
 
43% (147) 
65% (225) 
79% (272) 
58% (200) 
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Table 2. Frequency of Analytic Activities within Agency (n = 345) 
 
 
Analytic Activity 
Frequency  
Valid Percent (n) 
Daily Weekly Bi-Weekly Monthly Less than Monthly Never 
Crime Pattern Analysis 17.4% 
(60) 
14.2% 
(49) 
3.2% 
(11) 
8.1% 
(28) 
15.1% 
(52) 
42.0% 
(145) 
Crime Mapping 14.5% 
(50) 
14.5% 
(51) 
2.3% 
(8) 
7.8% 
(27) 
14.8% 
(51) 
45.8% 
(158) 
Geographic Profiling 8.7% 
(30) 
10.1% 
(35) 
2.3% 
(8) 
6.1% 
(21) 
16.8%  
(58) 
55.9% 
(153) 
Hot Spots Analysis 11.0% 
(38) 
14.5% 
(50) 
2.9% 
(10) 
9.0% 
(31) 
14.5% 
(50) 
48.1% 
(166) 
Traffic Analysis 5.8% 
(20) 
6.1% 
(21) 
1.4% 
(5) 
9.9% 
(34) 
14.8% 
(51) 
62.0% 
(214) 
Analyze Suspicious Activity Reports 20.3% 
(70) 
10.1% 
(35) 
2.6% 
(9) 
7.0% 
(24) 
11.3% 
(39) 
48.7% 
(168) 
Critical Infrastructure Risk Assessment 5.8% 
(20) 
2.6% 
(9) 
.3% 
(1) 
6.7% 
(23) 
26.7% 
(92) 
58.0% 
(200) 
Criminal Commodity Vulnerability  4.6% 
(16) 
1.7% 
(6) 
1.7% 
(6) 
4.1% 
(14) 
14.8% 
(51) 
73.0% 
(252) 
Statewide and/or Regional Risk  4.3% 
(15) 
3.2% 
(11) 
2.3% 
(8) 
6.4% 
(22) 
17.7% 
(61) 
66.1% 
(228) 
Identify Criminal Enterprises 10.7% 
(37) 
11.3% 
(39) 
3.5% 
(12) 
10.7% 
(37) 
17.1% 
(49) 
46.7% 
(161) 
Identify Threats to the Jurisdiction 17.7% 
(61) 
10.7% 
(37) 
3.8% 
(13) 
8.4% 
(29) 
15.4% 
(53) 
44.1% 
(152) 
Criminal Investigation Support 37.7% 
(130) 
11.6% 
(40) 
1.2% 
(4) 
6.7% 
(23) 
7.0% 
(24) 
35.9% 
(124) 
Proactive Strategic Analysis 11.9% 
(41) 
9.6% 
(22) 
6.1% 
(21) 
4.9% 
(17) 
14.8% 
(51) 
52.8% 
(152) 
Visual Investigative Analysis 13.3% 
(46) 
9.9% 
(34) 
3.5% 
(12) 
4.9% 
(17) 
10.1% 
(35) 
58.3% 
(201) 
Alerts and Notifications 23.2% 
(80) 
18.0% 
(62) 
5.5% 
(19) 
3.2% 
(11) 
5.8% 
(20) 
44.3% 
(153) 
De-confliction of Information 13.6% 
(47) 
8.4% 
(29) 
3.5% 
(12) 
5.8% 
(20) 
10.7% 
(37) 
58% 
(200) 
Public Health Trend Analysis 1.7% 
(6) 
4.1% 
(14) 
3.2% 
(11) 
3.8% 
(13) 
15.1% 
(52) 
72.2% 
(249) 
Case Correlation 21.7% 
(75) 
13.9% 
(48) 
3.8% 
(13) 
3.5% 
(12) 
10.1% 
(35) 
47.0% 
(162) 
Link Analysis 15.4% 
(53) 
12.5% 
(43) 
6.4% 
(22) 
7.5% 
(26) 
11.9% 
(41) 
46.4% 
(160) 
Social Network Analysis 11.6% 
(40) 
8.7% 
(30) 
4.1% 
(14) 
6.4% 
(22) 
12.2% 
(42) 
57.1% 
(197) 
Telephone Toll Analysis 9.0% 
(31) 
5.8% 
(20) 
5.5% 
(19) 
5.5% 
(19) 
18.6% 
(64) 
55.7% 
(192) 
Flowcharting 8.4% 
(29) 
6.4% 
(22) 
6.4% 
(22) 
6.1% 
(21) 
20.9% 
(72) 
51.9%  
(179) 
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Table 3. Types and Frequency of Analytic Products Created within Agencies (n = 345) 
 
Products Produced 
Frequency 
Valid Percent (n) 
Daily Weekly Bi-Weekly Monthly Upon Request Never 
Bulletins 7.2% 
(25) 
22.0% 
(76) 
20.0% 
(69) 
17.7% 
(61) 
11.7% 
(39) 
21.7% 
(75) 
Risk Assessments 12.5% 
(43) 
39.4% 
(146) 
4.3% 
(15) 
4.3% 
(15) 
5.5% 
(19) 
33.9% 
(117) 
Advisories 7.0% 
(24) 
33.0% 
(114) 
11.0% 
(38) 
11.9% 
(41) 
6.7%  
(23) 
30.4% 
(105) 
Alerts 6.1% 
(21) 
35.9% 
(124) 
12.8% 
(44) 
12.2% 
(42) 
7.0% 
(24) 
26.1% 
(90) 
Warnings 6.1% 
(21) 
34.8% 
(120) 
10.7% 
(37) 
10.4% 
(36) 
4.1% 
(14) 
33.9% 
(117) 
Executive Reports 8.1% 
(28) 
30.5% 
(105) 
4.1% 
(14) 
6.4% 
(22) 
7.5% 
(26) 
43.5% 
(150) 
Briefings  6.1% 
(21) 
28.1% 
(97) 
12.5% 
(43) 
7.0% 
(24) 
10.7% 
(37) 
35.7% 
(123) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Types and Frequency of Information Agencies Receive from Outside Agencies (n = 
345) 
 
Type of Information Received 
Frequency 
Valid Percent (n) 
Daily Weekly Bi-Weekly Monthly Less than Monthly Never 
Suspicious Activity Reports 28.7% 
(99) 
20.0% 
(69) 
4.9% 
(17) 
7.8% 
(27) 
10.4% 
(36) 
28.1% 
(97) 
Crime Reports 34.2% 
(118) 
16.2% 
(56) 
4.1% 
(14) 
8.4% 
(29) 
10.4% 
(36) 
26.7% 
(92) 
Crime Maps 11.9% 
(41) 
13.3% 
(46) 
4.1% 
(14) 
7.5% 
(26) 
19.1%  
(66) 
44.1% 
(152) 
Witness / Suspect Interrogations 11.9% 
(41) 
10.4% 
(36) 
3.5% 
(12) 
9.6% 
(33) 
13.3% 
(46) 
51.3% 
(177) 
Threat Assessments 14.8% 
(51) 
13.9% 
(48) 
3.5% 
(12) 
13.9% 
(48) 
19.4% 
(67) 
34.5% 
(119) 
News Reports 47.2% 
(163) 
10.7% 
(37) 
.9% 
(3) 
3.5% 
(12) 
6.1% 
(21) 
31.6% 
(109) 
Other Open Sources 41.7% 
(144) 
12.2% 
(42) 
2.9% 
(10) 
3.5% 
(12) 
6.4% 
(22) 
33.3% 
(115) 
Human Intelligence 25.8% 
(189) 
17.1% 
(59) 
3.8% 
(13) 
7.5% 
(26) 
10.1% 
(35) 
35.7% 
(123) 
TIPS-Line 21.4% 
(74) 
11.0% 
(38) 
2.9% 
(10) 
7.0% 
(24) 
13.0% 
(45) 
44.6% 
(154) 
9-1-1 Calls 31.3% 
(108) 
4.9% 
(17) 
2.0% 
(7) 
4.6% 
(16) 
8.4% 
(29) 
48.7% 
(168) 
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Table 5. Agencies Access to Information Sources (n = 345) 
 
Information Source  
Yes 
Valid Percent (n) 
Motor vehicle records 83.8% 
(289) 
Driver’s license information 83.8% 
(289) 
Correctional databases 67.0% 
(231) 
National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System 63.8% 
(220) 
National Crime Information Center 78.0% 
(269) 
Intelink 15.7% 
(254) 
Infragard 15.9% 
(55) 
Sex offender registries 80.9% 
(279) 
Health-related information 19.1% 
(66) 
Law Enforcement Information Network  16.2% 
(56) 
Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit 15.7% 
(54) 
Homeland Security Information Network 27.8% 
(96) 
Regional Information Sharing System 55.9% 
(193) 
Open Source Information System  9.3% 
(32) 
Law Enforcement Online 64.9% 
(224) 
Regional and National Data Exchange 9.9% 
(34) 
FBI Net 17.7% 
(61) 
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas  38.3% 
(132) 
Homeland Secure Data Network  11.9% 
(41) 
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Table 6. Factors Critical for Analyst Performance Evaluation (n = 345) 
 
Factors  
Yes 
Valid Percent (n) 
Agency does not assess intelligence analyst performance 28.1% 
(97) 
Number of strategic products produced 13.6% 
(47) 
Number of tactical products produced 11.6% 
(40) 
Number of risk assessments completed 9.0% 
(31) 
Quality of strategic products produced 21.2% 
(73) 
Quality of tactical products produced  20.0% 
(69) 
Quality of risk assessments completed 13.9% 
(48) 
Number of actions that led to investigation being opened 14.2% 
(49) 
Number of actions the led to an arrest 15.4% 
(53) 
Number of actions that led to a conviction 7.5% 
(26) 
Number of contacts had with personnel within the agency 15.4% 
(53) 
Number of contacts with personnel from outside agencies 15.7% 
(54) 
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Appendix A.  Survey Questions Organized by Table 
Table 1. Law Enforcement Sample Descriptives 
• Has your agency adopted ILP?
• Do you have a policy designed expressly to guide your intelligence function?
• Does your agency’s intelligence function follow the NCISP recommendations?
• Does your agency’s intelligence function align with the TCL?
Table 2. Frequency of Analytic Activities within Agency 
• How frequently do the person(s) responsible for conducting intelligence-related analysis in your agency
perform / are involved in the following tasks?
o Crime Pattern Analysis
o Crime Mapping
o Geographic Profiling
o Hot Spots Analysis
o Traffic Analysis
o Analyze Suspicious Activity Reports
o Critical Infrastructure Risk Assessment
o Criminal Commodity Vulnerability
o Statewide and/or Regional Risk
o Identify Criminal Enterprises
o Identify Threats to the Jurisdiction
o Criminal Investigation Support
o Proactive Strategic Analysis
o Visual Investigative Analysis
o Alerts and Notifications
o De-confliction of Information
o Public Health Trend Analysis
o Case Correlation
o Link Analysis
o Social Network Analysis
o Telephone Toll Analysis
o Flowcharting
Table 3. Types and Frequency of Analytic Products Created within Agencies 
• How frequently does your agency create the following intelligence products?
o Bulletins
o Risk Assessments
o Advisories
o Alerts
o Warnings
o Executive Reports
o Briefings
Table 4. Types and Frequency of Information Analysts Receive from Outside Agencies 
• How frequently do the intelligence analysts in the agency receive the following information from outside
agencies?
o Suspicious Activity Reports
o Crime Reports
o Crime Maps
o Witness / Suspect Interrogations
o Threat Assessments
o News Reports
o Other Open Sources
o Human Intelligence
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o TIPS-Line
o 9-1-1 Calls
Table 5. Analyst Access to Information Sources 
• Analysts have access to which of the following sources of information ?
o Motor vehicle records
o Driver’s license information
o Correctional databases
o National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System
o National Crime Information Center
o Intelink
o Infragard
o Sex offender registries
o Health-related information
o Law Enforcement Information Network
o Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit
o Homeland Security Information Network
o Regional Information Sharing System
o Open Source Information System
o Law Enforcement Online
o Regional and National Data Exchange
o FBI Net
o High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas
o Homeland Secure Data Network
Table 6. Factors Critical for Analyst Performance Evaluation 
• What factors are critical for assessing an analyst's (or personnel responsible for the intelligence function)
performance in your agency?
o Agency does not assess intelligence analyst performance
o Number of strategic products produced
o Number of tactical products produced
o Number of risk assessments completed
o Quality of strategic products produced
o Quality of tactical products produced
o Quality of risk assessments completed
o Number of actions that led to investigation being opened
o Number of actions the led to an arrest
o Number of actions that led to a conviction
o Number of contacts had with personnel within the agency
o Number of contacts with personnel from outside agencies
